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MITI’s 
Secret Life
The Japanese industry policy model has been a 
beacon for the Australian union movement in its 
struggle to situate itself in the region. But Kanishka 
Jayasuriya argues that the importance of the 
Japanese model has been dramatically overes­
timated.
ith the end of the 
cold war, the 
d ivision  betw een
_________  the communist and
the capitalist world is being 
replaced by new sets of interna­
tional cleavages. One that is be­
coming more salient is that 
betw een liberal m arket 
econom ies in the English- 
speaking w orld and the 
Japanese or East Asian type of 
market economy. American ob­
servers like Francis Fukuyama 
appear to suggest that this 
cleavage will be the frontier 
where the next international 
battle of ideas will be fought.
Another influential group, comprised 
m ainly of academ ics and media 
analysts, contends that Japanese in­
dustry policy and, in particular, the 
relationship between the state and the 
market in Japan is an impediment to 
free trade between the US and Japan. 
Advocates of this point of view have 
gained an influential foothold in some 
parts of the United States political 
structure.
In a similar way, a significant debate 
has emerged in both the developed
and developing countries about the 
relative roles of the market vis a vis the 
state in economic development. Many 
argue for using industry policy to pro­
vide incentives to nurture certain 
high-tech industries, despite the lack 
of any clear comparative advantage 
for these types of industry. In other 
words, policy can be used to pick out 
ind u stries w hich are potential 
'winners' in the international market 
place. This argument has a good deal 
of support in the Australian labour 
movement and on the Left.
These policy stances appear to reflect, 
either implicitly or explicitly, the in­
fluence of the Japanese model of in­
dustry policy. However, I want to 
argue here that this view is based on a 
m isleading interpretation of the 
Japanese model, chiefly because it 
ascribes to policy a strong capacity to 
shape industry structure and or­
ganisation. A closer reading of the 
Japanese experience would suggest 
that in reality the effect of industry 
policy in these areas is highly limited. 
W hatever effect it has lies in its 
capacity to shape, support and en­
courage pre-existing strengths in 
various industrial sectors, organisa­
tional patterns and activities. The 
emerging industry policy model is 
simplistic in that it assumes that in­
dustry policy is merely a matter of 
picking 'winners and losers'. It also
makes the dubious assumption that 
these winners are primarily to be 
found in the lucrative high-tech areas 
where, with a combination of the right 
policies, golden economic eggs can be 
hatched.
Given the influence of Japanese policy 
on such ideas, it is critically important 
to examine more closely the real les­
sons that could be drawn from the 
Japanese model and determine more 
accurately how it functions. Much of 
the rationale for the current forms of 
industry policy pursued in a number 
of countries arises from a misreading 
of the Japanese model. A little bit of 
history might be relevant here. At one 
time, the conventional wisdom was 
that the h igh level of Jap anese 
economic performance was due to the 
p ursu it of m arket conform ing 
policies.
In other words, policy makers served 
to create the 'level playing field' 
beloved of neoclassical economists. 
However, this conception soon had to 
confront the evidence of extensive 
public intervention in the market to 
support certain industries. For ex­
ample, a persistent feature of Japanese 
industry policy was the closure of the 
local market to foreign producers 
during the period in which local in- . 
dustry was made export competitive. 
Likewise, many analysts have noted
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the widespread use by Japanese in­
dustry of strategic industry and trade 
p olicy  to encourage im portant 
capacities, such as learning by doing, 
that m arket structures failed to 
deliver.
Not surprisingly, therefore, an alter­
native view of Japanese economic 
performance to the discredited 'level 
playing field' hypothesis has em­
phasised the importance of the state 
in promoting economic develop­
ment. Both the proponents of the 
market and of statist perspectives un­
derline the importance of economic 
and political aspects of Japanese 
economic growth. Indeed, initially 
these two perspectives coincided 
with the disciplinary boundaries of 
econom ics and political science, 
though the increasing dominance of 
the statist point of view in recent 
years has blurred some of these dis­
ciplinary divisions.
The 'statist' conventional wisdom of 
the recent past focused heavily on 
one key agency—Japan's Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry 
(MITI)—and its part in developing a 
range of industrial markets. These in­
terventions range from the provision 
of subsidies to the organisation of re­
search and development (R and D). 
The lesson of the Japanese model, ac­
cording to this thesis, is the need to 
comprehend the active role played by 
MITI in fostering industrial develop­
ment. In fact, MITI is imitated right 
across the globe in the hope of 
replicating Japan's economic success. 
Central to this argument is the notion 
that M ITI has a high degree of 
autonomy from business interests, 
which enhances its capacity to inter­
vene in industrial markets in the pur­
suit of long-term interests. It is this 
strength that gives the Japanese state 
the ability to intervene effectively in 
the operation of a variety of industrial 
markets.
A cursory examination of Japanese 
policy history tends to support the 
proposition that this form of inter­
vention was indeed highly effective 
in securing the development of key 
industrial sectors. But the argument 
is fraught with difficulties. First, the 
record of intervention itself is some­
what clouded by the fact that on 
many occasions MITI has often been 
defeated by business-led opposition. 
Indeed, quite often business came to
dom inate postw ar regulatory 
mechanisms for implementing in­
dustry policy—a far cry from the pic­
ture of MITI independence painted 
by the proponents of the statist ap­
proach. It should also be remembered 
that MITI often failed to obtain legis­
lative approval to expand its powers.
Another key difficulty encountered 
by the statist approach is 
methodological. To demonstrate that 
MITI has been an active player is by 
itself not sufficient to establish that 
favourable outcomes have been the 
result of its intervention. An equally 
plausible reading of the evidence is 
that MITI actions simply reflected in­
dustry demands. In other words, on 
a reading of the internal history of 
MITI alone, the direction of causation 
remains unclear. What this suggests 
is that MITI policies in a specific sec­
tor need to be put into the context of 
the development of that whole sector. 
When looked at in this manner, the 
apparent independent influence of 
MTTI on Japanese industrial develop­
ment is much less than that normally 
claimed by advocates of a doctrinaire 
statist viewpoint.
A final problem with this approach is 
that it places too much weight on 
policy. The Japanese experience sug­
gests that what is important is not the 
right policies alone, but also the right 
industrial structure. Industrial struc­
tures are the results of specific histori­
cal and external forces that are highly 
durable. By themselves, policies can­
not fundamentally change the basic 
nature of industrial organisation.
For these reasons, a body of writing 
has emerged which suggests that the 
nature of Japanese industrial 
development is best understood in 
terms of the specific way in which 
industrial sectors are organised. 
What this perspective—we might call 
it institutionalist—suggests is that
markets are important, but not in the 
sense of the neoclassical 'level play­
ing field' approach. Instead, it em­
p hasises the sp ecific  typ es of 
organisation structures which are 
characteristic of Japanese industrial 
activity. These structures include the 
way in which large industrial groups 
in any one sector are linked to their 
suppliers in a complex network.
In such networks, the ties that bind 
are not only economic, but are also 
found in the investment in trust 
which an economic network entails. 
In fact, from this perspective, many 
of the cultural attributes and norms 
that are often identified as invisible 
forces w hich shape econom ic 
development are more explicable as 
ration al econom ic responses. 
Moreover, the notion of organisation 
goes beyond this type of networking 
to include the way in which work, 
and even attitudes to work, are struc­
tured. It also includes the very impor- 
tant arrangem ents that link the 
private sector to the state. From this 
institutional perspective, the or­
ganisational structures that charac­
terise the leading Japanese industrial 
sectors such as electronics are the key 
to understanding the nature of 
Japanese industrial strength.
A further important facet of the 
Japanese organisational structure is 
the flexib le  nature of Japanese 
prod uction . M ass prod uction  
methods of the traditional 'Fordist' 
type are organised around the 
production of one standard product 
of high volume and at the lowest cost. 
Both machinery and workers become 
specialised such that they can be 
used for one specific task. Flexible 
production, on the other hand, is 
structured around an organisation 
capable of producing a wide variety 
of goods able to satisfy specific 
needs. Under this form of industrial 
production, workers need to be high­
ly skilled with a capacity to work in 
different settings. They also have to 
be flexible and adapt rapidly to chan­
ges in the way a particular product is 
produced. Further, a critical or­
ganisational pressure for flexible 
producers is the need to maintain 
close contact with suppliers. Conse­
quently, enterprise networking is a 
key feature of this type of organisa­
tion.
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Japanese success in sectors such as 
electronics has been made possible by 
the fact that these have been well 
suited to a flex ib le  production  
process. For instance, the Japanese 
electronics industry has been geared 
towards producing for market niches 
and adapting rapidly to changing 
consumer needs. In a similar manner, 
Japanese dominance in the area of 
auto-production points to the supe­
rior nature of such innovations as 'just 
in time' production.
By contrast, the Japanese have been 
lagging in areas such as aerospace and 
biotechnology where these types of 
production processes are not as im­
portant in securing an advantage, and 
which require different structures for 
harnessing R and D (such as state- 
sponsored research  centres and 
university-based innvoation). It is in 
these research areas that Japan is rela­
tively weak in comparison with the 
US. Therefore, even in areas such as R 
and D w hich seem to be highly 
amenable to public intervention, it is 
the way in which an industrial or any
other market is structured which 
counts.
What, then, are the lessons of the 
Japanese experience for countries like
• Australia? Firstly, it suggests that cur­
rent ideas about industrial targeting 
are based on a far too simplistic notion 
about the role and significance of MITI 
in Japan's industrial development. 
One clear lesson is that policy by itself 
is unlikely to have much impact on the 
pattern of industrial development. Ef­
fective and successful policies operate 
in conjunction with other structural 
forms such as the way market institu­
tions are organised. Secondly, an em­
phasis on either the state or the market 
as the critical element in Japanese in­
dustrial development is misplaced. 
What is important is the way in­
dustrial markets are organised. There­
fore, policies directed at industrial 
targeting, rather than picking the 
golden industrial goose, may more 
likely end up creating a lame duck. 
Rather, policies should be aimed at 
enhancing existing organisational 
strengths.
Finally, the Japanese experience sug­
gests that the idea that all countries 
tend to move towards the same type 
of industrial structures needs to be 
abandoned. If there is one overriding 
lesson, it is that the type of industrial 
structure that a nation has is a product 
of a variety of factors, which cannot 
necessarily be replicated elsewhere. In 
fact, the most paradoxical lesson of the 
Japanese experience may be that a 
nation's industrial structure is heavily 
dependent on past pattern s of 
development. From a policy perspec­
tive, the current fascination in many 
developed and rapidly developing 
countries with the expansion of high- 
tech industries is likely to end in 
failure. The current debate between 
proponents and opponents of in­
dustry intervention is likely to remain 
unproductive as long as it continues 
to be based on such misleading no­
tions about states and markets.
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